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1 In  the  fallout  from  Obama’s  reelection  in  November  2012,  the  leadership  of  the
Republican National Committee (RNC) called for an examination of the party’s failure to
unseat the president. The subsequent “Growth and Opportunity Project” was released in
March of 2013 and was described by RNC chairman Reince Priebus as “the most public
and most comprehensive post-election review in the history of any national party.” The
report highlighted that Republican conservatism was increasingly out of touch with the
youth and with non-white Americans–obviously two important demographic groups in
the national election: “Young voters are increasingly rolling their eyes at what the Party
represents, and many minorities wrongly think that Republicans do not like them or want
them in the country…We need a Party whose brand of conservatism invites and inspires
new people to visit us… it should be a more welcoming conservatism.”1 The “Growth and
Opportunity” report, a remarkably frank self-assessment of Republican viability, is also
noteworthy for a glaring omission: it does not mention by name the tea party movement,
that somewhat ambiguous though much-discussed entity that has apparently pushed the
Republicans increasingly toward the political  right,  even while evidence mounts that
such efforts have diminished the overall popularity of the GOP in the age of Obama.
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2 Since the 1960s the Republican Party has absorbed a diverse collection of conservative
figures and ideas, and–despite some important discontinuities and conflicts–there is a
general ideological consistency that stretches from Barry Goldwater to Ronald Reagan to
George W. Bush. Today a new cohort of conservative leadership is guiding the party from
its right wing, as House Majority Leader Eric Cantor and other “young guns” associated
with the tea party have continued their attacks on Obama’s healthcare reform by tying it
to  what  would otherwise  be  routine  congressional  duties  of  raising the  federal  debt
ceiling  limit,  thereby  regularly  threatening  (and  occasionally  forcing)  offices  of  the
federal government to shut down. The tea party is also notable for its role in several
other high profile public issues related to taxes, gun control and immigration. 
3 There are several unresolved questions that remain at the center of scholarly writing on
the  tea  party:  is  it  fundamentally  consistent  with,  or  divergent  from,  the  historical
trajectory of conservative ideology in the post-WWII United States? Put differently, is the
tea party just the latest episode in the larger story of American conservatism and the
transformation of the Republican Party? If it is not, then what are its social origins? Is it
an economic movement,  concerned with bailouts,  taxes and budgets,  or  is  it  a  more
sinister manifestation of white racism, as its critics have often charged? Is it a genuine
grassroots movement, or has it  been orchestrated by the conservative establishment,
most notably by Fox News? The answers offered by some of the leading social scientists in
the United States have varied widely. In his 2011 book, The Rise of the Tea Party: Political
Discontent  in the Age of  Obama,  Anthony DiMaggio argues that the tea party is  not an
independent or grassroots movement at all, but a creation of the far-right conservative
establishment,  whose rhetoric has been uncritically diffused through various national
media  outlets.  In  a  recent  essay  in  Rolling  Stone,  the  historian Sean Wilentz  offers  a
different assessment: the Republican Party reached a “new and more radical phase” with
the election of George W. Bush in 2000 and has since “joined a relatively small number of
major American political parties that [have become] the captive of a narrow ideology and
[have] either jettisoned or silenced their more moderate elements.” For Wilentz, the tea
party, “so contemptuous of American history and institutions,” has little to do with the
postwar conservatism of  Republican Party,  although it  remains a  very real  threat  to
American democracy.2
4 A new book, Change They Can’t Believe In: The Tea Party and Reactionary Politics in America,
authored by Christopher S. Parker and Matt A. Barreto, colleagues at the University of
Washington,  Seattle,  sheds some new light on these questions.  The book is  based on
Parker and Barreto’s impressive quantitative multistate survey project (the Multi-State
Survey of Race and Politics,  the details of which are helpfully available in the book’s
appendix) in 2010 and 2011 at the Survey Research Lab at the University of Washington.
The authors focused their analysis on those who sympathize with the tea party, rather
than on movement  leaders  and participants.  They note  that  in  order  to  explain the
success of tea party candidates in the 2010 midterm elections (for example Marco Rubio
in Florida, Ron Johnson in Wisconsin, and Pat Toomey in Pennsylvania) it is necessary to
look  beyond the  few thousand  citizens  who  actively  identify  as  tea  party  members.
“Remaining confined to movement members doesn’t come close to explaining the success
the Tea Party achieved in these races. Only if we consider those who sympathize with the
Tea Party can we begin to appreciate these results” (16).
5 Parker and Barreto devote much of the subsequent analysis to showing how their data
illustrates  that  tea  party  supporters  and  sympathizers  do  not  represent  a  slice  of
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mainstream public opinion. Rather, tea party supporters are statistically distinct from tea
party “skeptics” and, importantly, also from “mainstream” conservatives on a wide range
of issues: from general support for Obama, to various indicators of social tolerance such
as  gay marriage and immigration issues.  This  of  course begs  the question:  what  has
caused this divergence, and how can these attitudes be explained? Through statistical
techniques, the authors “hold constant” various possible causal factors that could explain
these opinions. They conclude that Obama himself appears to have some sort of sui generis
impact inexplicable by racism, party affiliation or various other ideological or political
factors, such as a disdain for “big government.” For Parker and Barreto, the tea party is a
manifestation of identity politics: Obama (as president and thus as “America personified”)
represents a “symbolic threat” to the historic white monopoly of political, economic and
social  power in the United States.  “We argue that these [anti-Obama] sentiments are
driven by anxiety that associated with the perception that Obama and his confederates
are subversive forces, ones that threaten to steal ‘their’ country” (35). 
6 In advancing this claim, the book bears the stylistic hallmarks of conventional American
political science, as complex historical processes are reduced to a series of quantitative
variables that supposedly uncover a positivistic causal relation. “Critics may assert that
the effect we observe for Obama is really about expressing dislike for what they see as
Obama’s socialist agenda, not fear of subversion per se…That would be a credible claim
had we not controlled for ideology, preference for small government, and partisanship.
For good measure, we also added social dominance orientation, authoritarianism, and
ethnocentrism” (100). Throughout the book, the authors use support for the tea party as
an independent variable that explains attitudes about the president and various social
issues, although this causal relation is never engaged in a more critical conceptual or
methodological sense. Only once do the authors acknowledge that the causal mechanism
they repeatedly identify may in fact be the exact opposite than what they propose. “So
far, we’re sure that the reader probably presumes that direction of causality runs from
support for the Tea Party to attitudes about Obama. While identification with the Tea
Party may conceivably cause someone to believe Obama is not a practicing Christian, for
instance, it may also be the case that the causal relation is reversed. In other words,
people may come to support the Tea Party because they don’t like the president, or don’t
trust him. In the absence of experimental data, there’s no way for us to know for sure
what’s causing what” (213). 
7 These  sorts  of  methodological  uncertainties  are  well  known  issues  that  quantitative
researchers  tend  to  downplay  in  favor  of  more  orderly  and  easily  summarized
conclusions.  But  this  is  not  the  only  way  in  which  Parker  and  Barreto  gloss  over
potentially deeper conceptual issues. Throughout the book, the authors recognize that
American conservatives are not a homogeneous group–and that they never have been.
For example, in his important book, The Conservative Intellectual Tradition in American Since
1945,  George Nash argues that American conservatism is historically derived from the
intermingling of anticommunism, social conservatism and libertarianism, and that these
distinct strains of conservative thought have formed a coalition that is not necessarily
intuitive or permanent.  But in Change They Can’t Believe  In ,  the only sub-grouping of
conservatism is between “mainstream” versus “reactionary.” And for Parker and Barreto,
tea  party  support  is  a  proxy  for  reactionary  conservatism,  which  is  at  odds  with
mainstream conservative ideology and its media outlets such as National Review Online.
Surprisingly, little mention is made of Fox News and whether it qualifies as mainstream
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or as reactionary, and on what basis this distinction would be made. In advancing their
reactionary versus conservative framework, Parker and Barreto compare the tea party to
two earlier examples of similar movements in American history: the Ku Klux Klan and the
John  Birch  Society–both  of  which,  they  argue,  are  departures  from  “mainstream
conservative” values in that they undermine public order and social unity. In the case of
the John Birch Society, its anticommunist doctrine was “a flagrant violation of freedom, a
chief goal of [mainstream] conservatism” (254). 
8 The conceptualization of  conservatism as either “mainstream” or “reactionary” leads
directly to the authors’ difficulty in explaining fissures between libertarians and social
conservatives in today’s tea party. For example, they write, “Libertarianism and these
anti-gay, socially conservative impulses create great tension in the tea party, tension that
is  evident  both in…campaign websites  and Tea Party  message boards.”  But  although
Parker  and  Barreto  acknowledge  tea  party  in-fighting,  both  libertarians  and  social
conservatives are apparently classified as being “mainstream,” if for no other reason than
they’ve “been around since the 1950s”(174). Thus, the authors’ analytical categories are
unable to absorb and explain the contemporary and historical dynamics of the tea party
and of conservatism more generally. Furthermore, their framework downplays the ways
in  which  “reactionary”  elements  have  been  incorporated  into  the  “mainstream”
conservative fold during the postwar era. Although many conservative leaders eventually
did distance themselves from the controversial organization, they did not do so because
of an ideological incompatibility between their “mainstream” conservative ideas and the
more “reactionary” anticommunism of  the Birchers.  Instead,  in the aftermath of  the
Goldwater defeat  in 1964,  conservative leaders  recognized that  they needed “a more
welcoming conservatism,” to borrow a phrase form the recent RNC report noted at the
outset of this review. Indeed the Koch family fortune, instrumental in the rise of the Birch
society, would continue to fund conservative organizations and politicians for decades to
come. And a vehement anticommunist ideology, dormant since the end of the Cold War
but  resurrected  with  a  vengeance  in  the  age  of  Obama,  would  continue  to  shape
conservative ideology long after the JBS itself fell out of fashion. The same might be said
of explicit racism and the KKK. For example, as the work of Kevin Kruse and Matt Lassiter
have shown, in the years after the civil  rights movement,  southern white Americans
devised new code words as they attempted to present their racism in more “respectable”
ways. Thus, it would seem that “mainstream conservatism” varies in degree rather than
in kind from more “reactionary” elements, and that the intermingling of these forms
have been so central to the ascendancy of the American conservative movement in the
post-WWII era: from the “southern strategy” of Nixon and Phillips, to Phyllis Schlafly,
Anita Bryant and the patriotic hardhats who fought to woo white racists and to keep the
feminists, gays and uppity students in “their place,” respectively. Thus, I do not take issue
with the historical claim that the tea party resembles in its ideology and demographic
constituency earlier forms of “reactionary” conservatism. Rather, I would suggest that
these  “reactionary”  groups  cannot  so  easily  be  separated  from  “mainstream”
conservative elements. Instead of seeing various “reactionary” movements as key to the
rising conservatism of the postwar era, Parker and Barreto are more inclined to see them
as  something  that  occasionally  “crop  up”  (245)  before  being  pushed  back  by
“mainstream” forces. 
9 There are two other general weaknesses of the book. First, the authors make no mention
of economic factors in the rise of the tea party. Anthony DiMaggio has argued that the
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rise of the tea party was designed to “rebrand” the GOP as a party of “the people” in the
aftermath of  the economic meltdown of  2008,  which was triggered by the bipartisan
deregulatory efforts of free market ideologues and business interests during the 1980s
and  1990s.  Parker  and  Barreto  dismiss  any  economic  “causality”  of  reactionary
movements:  “it  appears  that  the  state  of  the  economy  can  tell  us  little  about  the
likelihood of [their] emergence”(34). This may or may not be the case, although it rules
out a key dimension emphasized in much of the tea party scholarship, including the role
of political and economic elites, via Fox News and other conservative outlets, in fostering
and maintaining the appearance of the tea party movement. Finally, the authors draw
from several disciplines of social science, particularly from social psychology, in their
analyses of reactionary social  movements.  Perhaps this criticism stems from my own
background in sociology, but their use of childhood psychology to explain reactionary
conservatism as “guided by the social  learning to which the individual  is  exposed in
childhood” feels somewhat out of place (101, 103, 224, 238).
10 In conclusion, Change They Can’t Believe In is an important work that contributes to our
understanding of the nature of the tea party through an impressive quantitative study of
the movement and those sympathetic to it. The strength of this book is its empirical data
rather than its conceptual treatment of the tea party or its historical analysis of American
conservatism.  The  book  can  be  recommended  for  its  unsurpassed  summary  of  the
political and social attitudes of tea party sympathizers. Although the definitive book on
the tea party movement has yet to be written, Parker and Barreto have provided a unique
contribution toward that end. 
NOTES
1.  The “Growth and Opportunity” report is online here.
2.  The Rolling Stone essay by Sean Wilentz can be found here. 
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